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The Jurisprudence of Antitrust Divestiture: The
Path Less Traveled
E. Thomas Sullivan
t
"Breaking up is hard to do."1
t Dean and William S. Pattee Professor of Law, University of Minnesota
Law School. Grateful appreciation is acknowledged to my colleagues, Profes-
sors Dan Gifford, David McGowan, Jeff Harrison, Leo Raskind, and Brad
Clary for their valuable comments on this Article, and Matthew A. Moore and
Christina M. Szitta for their very able research assistance. A short version of
this Article was published as an essay earlier by The United States Law Week.
70 U.S. L. WK. 2019 (2001).
As this Article went to press, the Department of Justic and Microsoft
proposed a consent decree. Nine states are opposing the consent decree, while
nine have agreed. The proposed consent decree will be subject to public com-
ment for sixty days after appropriate notice has been published, and then,
pursuant to the Tunney Act, the district court will review the proposed con-
sent decree along with the public comments. The court is not likely to act
upon the proposed consent decree until the spring of 2002.
Preliminarily, the proposed consent decree incorporates many of the
suggestions discussed in this Article, including (1) requiring Microsoft to share
the inner workings of its Windows operating system with other software firms;
(2) requiring Microsoft to permit other software products to be placed on Mi-
crosoft's Windows system by computer makers; (3) requiring Microsoft to pro-
vide software developers with interface necessities to inner-operate with Win-
dows and to offer uniform licensing terms to key computer makers; (4)
prohibiting Microsoft from entering into exclusive dealing arrangements that
require exclusive support or development of Microsoft software; (5) prohibiting
Microsoft from retaliating or punishing anyone in the sale or distribution of
personal computers who makes or uses competing products; and (6) establish-
ing a panel of computer experts to monitor the agreed upon terms.
While the proposed consent decree requires Microsoft to disclose tech-
nical data known as middleware to assist competitors making programs and
gives manufacturers greater freedom to sell and lease machines with non-
Microsoft middleware, while forcing Microsoft to establish standard royalties
and licensing terms for the twenty largest computer makers (though volume
discounts and other incentives may affect prices), the proposed consent decree
does not require Microsoft to disclose code for its operating system, nor does it
require Microsoft to unbundle its Internet Explorer browser from the operat-
ing system. The proposed consent decree also does not mention the legal con-
sequences of the consent decree, once finalized, regarding the law of collateral
estoppel, which implicates the other pending lawsuits.
1. Neil Sedaka, Breaking Up is Hard to Do, on SINGS HIS GREATEST HITS
(RCA 1962).
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In its decision in United States v. Microsoft Corp.,2 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
broached, but did not answer, a question that has been the sub-
ject of much recent debate: "[Whether, and to what extent,cur-
rent monopolization doctrine should be amended to account for
competition in technologically dynamic markets characterized
by network effects."3 The court of appeals noted that Microsoft
presented novel divestiture issues because it did not involve the
traditional use of divestiture to remedy an illegal combination
of stocks or assets.4 Although the technology sector has weak-
ened in recent months, software and the new economy have
continued to become more integral in everyday life and busi-
ness. It is therefore instructive to consider when, or even if, di-
vestiture could appropriately remedy a conduct violation in the
new economy.
Though the Bush Administration has decided not to pursue
divestiture as a remedy in the Microsoft case, Microsoft war-
rants continued discussion for two reasons. First, the case has
brought the complexities of divestiture to the forefront of anti-
trust law in the new economy. Before Microsoft, courts had not
addressed the applicability of divestiture in technologically dy-
namic markets characterized by network effects. In fact, had
the new administration not retreated from divestiture, Micro-
soft likely would have been only the third divestiture case in
the last two decades to reach the Supreme Court.5 Second, de-
spite the Bush Administration's decision to abandon the dives-
titure remedy, a number of state attorneys general prosecuting
the case, or private parties, may still decide to pursue the rem-
edy.6
When the court of appeals vacated and remanded the deci-
sion ordering divestiture in Microsoft by Judge Thomas Pen-
field Jackson, divestiture remained a viable remedy because
2. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
3. Id. at 50.
4. See id. at 105-06.
5. Recently, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to review the case. The
Court may, however, accept the case once a final remedy is entered. Microsoft
v. United States, 122 S.Ct. 350 (2001) (mem.) denying cert. to 253 F.3d 34
(2001). Therefore, California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990), and
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), affg United States v. Ameri-
can Telephone and Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), stand as the
only two divestiture cases to go before the Court in two decades.
6. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, U.S. v. Microsoft: Going Back to Square
One, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, §4, at 3.
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the alternative-a conduct-oriented remedy-had been tried in
earlier litigation and led to the failed 1995 consent decree.7
Judge Kollar-Kotelly, the district court judge currently as-
signed to the case, still has discretion to consider the scope of
possible remedies ranging from a structural breakup to behav-
ior-oriented injunctive relief.8
The district court must ultimately decide what effect any
remedy will have on consumer welfare and competition in e-
commerce. Surely, as one of the central questions, any court
must ask whether the costs associated with the resulting rem-
edy outweigh the public benefits. The historical record of court-
ordered divestiture informs our understanding of its viable ap-
plication both in the dynamic new economy, and perhaps in the
Microsoft case itself.9
Before the Department of Justice abandoned divestiture as
the preferred remedy, the court of appeals had instructed the
district court that divestiture remained a viable remedy. If the
district court finds a "causal connection between Microsoft's ex-
clusionary conduct and the company's position in the [operating
systems] market," divestiture is still proper. 10 The court of ap-
7. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1462 (D.C. Cir.
1995); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64-74 (D.D.C. 2000)
(entering the divestiture plan), vacated, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per cu-
riam); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45-47 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(per curiam) (vacating the divestiture plan and remanding the case); see also
infra note 321 and accompanying text.
8. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 45-47. Conduct-oriented orders might include
injunctive relief to (1) forbid the restrictions placed on the licensing agree-
ments with computer manufacturers and software companies; (2) license the
Windows operating system code to other companies; (3) require prior approval
by the court of any future bundling or tying of new products to the operating
system; (4) require price publication for software licenses; and (5) offer an op-
erating system with a variety of new applications or versions unbundled. See
Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. Microsoft Corp., (D.D.C. filed Nov.
2, 2001); see also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 247 U.S. 32, 39-56
(1918). See generally United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 347 U.S. 521
(1954).
9. See supra note 5. Although the Department of Justice may not at the
present be arguing in favor of divestiture, either the state attorneys general or
private parties may. Id. The district court has the ultimate discretion to im-
pose divestiture if conduct-oriented remedies prove to be ineffective as they
have in the past due to Microsofts recidivist conduct. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at
105-07.
10. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 107. Moreover, the court observed that "divesti-
ture is a common form of relief in successful antitrust prosecutions: it is in-
deed 'the most important of antitrust remedies.'" Id. at 105 (citing United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 331 (1961)).
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peals cautioned, however, that "[d]ivestiture is a remedy that is
imposed only with great caution, in part because its long-term
efficacy is rarely certain."1'
A case like Microsoft particularly warrants judicial caution.
Microsoft is the first case to reach the antitrust remedy stage in
the new economy. Under the Government's analysis, accepted
by the district and appellate courts, Microsoft maintained its
monopoly under the system of network effects. Within this sys-
tem, the value that a consumer derives from a good increases
along with the number of consumers using the good. This pro-
vides incentives for third parties to develop a derivative sup-
port network for the good, which increases the appeal to the
consumer, drives demand for the good, and creates a perpetuat-
ing cycle. As this Article discusses, this perpetuating cycle
complicates the remedy analysis and makes an already complex
decision more difficult. Indeed, the court of appeals admon-
ished the district court that with respect to the tying violation,
"[ilt is only after considerable experience with certain business
relationships that courts classify them as per se viola-
tions .... "'12 The court recognized that Microsoft represented a
novel and unprecedented case. 13 This admonishment was
equally instructive when considering divestiture as a remedy.
At this point, Microsoft still provides useful insights to analyze
divestiture in the context of a network market and the new
economy.
The Supreme Court's history of divestiture provides some
guidance. Historically, the Court has placed great weight on
the remedy stage of antitrust litigation.14 From the Court's
first divestiture case in 1911 to its most recent in 1990, the Su-
preme Court has decided at least fifty-two cases involving di-
vestiture and allowed divestiture as a remedy in all but
11. Id. at 80.
12. Id. at 84 (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979)).
13. Id.
14. For an example, see United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
366 U.S. 316 (1961):
[Tihe suit has been a futile exercise if the Government proves a
violation but fails to secure a remedy adequate to redress it. "A public
interest served by such civil suits is that they effectively pry open to
competition a market that has been closed by defendants' illegal re-
straints. If this decree accomplishes less than that, the Government
has won a lawsuit and lost a cause."
Id. (quoting Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947)).
[Vol. 86:565
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seven.15 The Court first used divestiture in Standard Oil Co. of
15. These fifty-two cases based on federal antitrust law have been liti-
gated through the courts to the Supreme Court. AT&T was broken up after a
consent decree rather than full litigation, but the case is too important to the
history of divestiture to leave out of any divestiture study. In addition, though
the divestiture was not the result of full litigation, a federal district court and
a circuit court were thoroughly involved in the enforcement and modification
of the decree for more than a decade. Many more cases dealing with divesti-
ture can be found in the circuit courts, district courts and among state law an-
titrust claims. See California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990); Mary-
land v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), affg United States v. Am. Tel.
and Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-
0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415
U.S. 486 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); United
States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549 (1971); Utah Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S. 464 (1969); Citizen Publ'g Co. v.
United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); Cont' Oil Co. v. United States, 393 U.S. 79
(1968) (per curiam); Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 390 U.S. 712 (1968)
(per curiam); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968); United
States v. Mercantile Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n, 389 U.S. 27 (1967) (per curiam);
United States v. Nat'l Steel Corp., 386 U.S. 1000 (1967); FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. United States,
385 U.S. 37 (1966) (per curiam); FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966);
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
270 (1966); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. United States, 382 U.S. 12 (1965) (Cup-
ples Mfg.); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. United States, 381 U.S. 414 (1965); FTC
v. Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965) (per curiam); United States v.
Cont'l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
377 U.S. 271 (1964) (Rome Cable); Koppers Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 856
(1962); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States
v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962) (per curiam); United States v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961); Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n
v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960); Int'l Boxing Club v. United States, 358
U.S. 242 (1959); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 347 U.S. 521
(1954) (per curiam); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Schine
Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948); United States v.
Nat'l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947) (per curiam); United States v. Pullman
Co., 330 U.S. 806 (1947) (per curiam); United States v. Crescent Amusement
Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944); Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928);
United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927); FTC v. Eastman Ko-
dak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927); FTC v. W. Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926); East-
man Kodak Co. v. United States, 255 U.S. 578 (1921); United States v. Lehigh
Valley R.R. Co., 254 U.S. 255 (1920); United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26
(1920); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); Corn
Products Ref. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 621 (1919); Int'l Harvester Co. v.
United States, 248 U.S. 587 (1918); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co. of
N.J., 247 U.S. 32 (1918); United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 226 U.S. 61
(1912); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912);
United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. of
N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). For details on these cases, see Ap-
pendix, infra, at 614-23.
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New Jersey v. United States16 to correct the harm it believed in-
junctive relief would not. Over time, the Supreme Court has
become more comfortable with the remedy. In the most recent
Supreme Court case involving divestiture, California v. Ameri-
can Stores Co.,1 7 the Court reiterated that when a section 7 vio-
lation of the Clayton Act has occurred, divestiture should come
to the "forefront" of the Court's analysis.' 8 Over the span of the
Supreme Court's divestiture jurisprudence, the Court has ana-
lyzed the appropriateness of divestiture and the conditions that
warrant the remedy.
This Article explores the connection between the history of
the Supreme Court's divestiture jurisprudence and the complex
divestiture issues raised by the new economy, and specifically,
by the suit pending against Microsoft. Part I examines the
theories behind divestiture, how the Court's theories have
changed over time, and various possible forms of divestiture.
Part II more closely examines specific instances where the Su-
preme Court considered divestiture. This Part first analyzes
five cases that resulted in divestiture and the implications of
the remedy. These cases also provide insight into the future of
cases like Microsoft if divestiture remains an option in the new
economy. Part II then analyzes five cases where the Supreme
Court either rejected or did not consider divestiture, even if an-
titrust violations had occurred. Part II concludes by summariz-
ing the insights provided in these cases to develop an analytical
framework that can be applied to any divestiture analysis.
Part III briefly describes the software market in which Mi-
crosoft operates. Part IV applies the analytical framework de-
rived in Part II to the unique aspects of the software and e-
commerce markets described in Part III to determine whether
divestiture can provide an appropriate remedy in the new econ-
omy. The Article concludes that divestiture may be an unwise
remedy in Microsoft and other e-commerce litigation.
I. THE THEORY OF DIVESTITURE
A. THEORETICAL PREMISES
Since the announcement of the Standard Oil opinion in
16. 221U.S. 1 (1911).
17. 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
18. See id. at 281 (citing United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
366 U.S. 316, 329-31 (1961)).
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1911, protection of the public welfare has been the guiding
principle of the Supreme Court's divestiture jurisprudence. 19
In Standard Oil, the defendant had created a monopoly of oil
distribution and sales by aggressively acquiring the stock of
other companies. 20 With the "conviction of a purpose and in-
tent," Standard Oil allocated geographic markets to companies
with no competition amongst them.21 Because Standard Oil's
improper conduct contributed to the establishment of its mo-
nopoly, the Court recognized that injunctive relief would insuf-
ficiently protect the public interest.22 Thus, divestiture became
a necessary remedy. In this respect, Standard Oil set the tone
for the next century of divestiture cases. Where the defendant
has engaged in improper conduct and an attempt to monopo-
lize, but has not attained market power, the Court has favored
injunctive relief.23 On the other hand, where the defendant has
illegally attained market power, the Court has favored divesti-
ture.24
19. [Injury to the public by the prevention of an undue restraint on, or the
monopolization of trade or commerce is the foundation upon which the
prohibitions of the statute rest, and moreover that one of the funda-
mental purposes of the statute is to protect, not to destroy, rights of
property.
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 78 (1911).
20. Id. at 76-77.
21. Id. at 77.
22. [Ordinarily where it was found that acts had been done in violation of
the statute, adequate measure of relief would result from restraining
the doing of such acts in the future. But in a case like this, where the
condition... is not only a continued attempt to monopolize, but also a
monopolization, the duty to enforce the statute requires the applica-
tion of broader and more controlling remedies.
Id. at 77 (citation omitted); cf. discussion of United States Steel, infra notes
194-202 and accompanying text.
23. Indeed, twenty-eight of the cases where divestiture was ordered were
brought under section 1 or section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2
(1994), for conduct violations, but only six were decided after 1960. Three of
these cases were brought under section 7. In later cases, injunctive relief was
the favored remedy. Divestiture was ordered, however, for various reasons
including complexity of implementation and distrust of the defendants. See
supra note 15.
24. Of the cases studied, twenty-eight of them were brought under section
7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). Eighteen of the recent cases were
brought due to a horizontal merger; five were brought due to a vertical
merger; three due to a combination of the two; and only two involved a combi-
nation of structural and conduct violations. In this light, the direction pro-
vided by the Court in American Stores that, where a section 7 violation of the
Clayton Act is found, divestiture should be in the "forefront" of the court's
mind for a remedy, is understandable. California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The theoretical premises underlying divestiture have var-
ied since Standard Oil. Initially, the Court utilized divestiture
for "trust busting." The theory supporting this application ad-
vanced that the likelihood of improper conduct increased with
the firm's size. Bad conduct, coupled with size, warranted di-
vestiture. If trusts like the Standard Oil Trust, or other large
enterprises, engaged in improper conduct, and if their divesti-
ture would not unduly injure the public, they should be dis-
mantled.2
After the Great Depression in the 1930s, economists en-
tered the discussion and began to analyze the relationship be-
tween structure and pricing. Economist Joe Bain and others
opined that structure determined conduct.26 To be sure, the
1950 revision of section 7 of the Clayton Act underscored the
important consequence of structure.2 7 Since then the Court has
continued to become more sophisticated in its divestiture
analysis, for example, by broadening the scope of economic sub-
stitutes it would consider,28 by considering even potential en-
trants to the market,29 and by shifting its analysis from market
271, 281 (1990) (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366
U.S. 316, 329-31 (1960)); supra note 15.
25. See EUGENE V. ROSTOW, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY 4
(1948).
26. JOE S. BAIN, PRICE THEORY 297-304 (1952).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 18. The 1950 revision prohibited the acquisition in whole
or part of the assets of another corporation when the effect could substantially
lessen competition or tend toward a monopoly. Section 7 currently reads in
pertinent part:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce
shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock
or other share capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the
assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.
Id.
28. "Where the area of effective competition cuts across industry lines, so
must the relevant line of commerce; otherwise an adequate determination of
the merger's true impact cannot be made." United States v. Contl Can Co.,
378 U.S. 441, 457 (1964).
29. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 570-75 (1967). Al-
though Procter & Gamble had not, at the time of the merger, entered the mar-
ket for liquid bleach (the relevant line of commerce) it produced complemen-
tary goods and acquired Clorox as an alternative to entering the market
independently. See id.
572 [Vol. 86:565
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share to market power.30
B. EXTRA-JUDICIAL EFFECTS ON DIVESTITURE
Despite the Court's increasing sophistication, the number
of divestiture cases that it regularly considers has decreased
significantly. During the 1960s, the Court heard twenty-four
divestiture cases. In contrast, since 1974 the Court has heard
only four.3 1 Further, although the Supreme Court has ordered
a total of forty-five divestitures since 1916, only two have oc-
curred within the last two decades: United States v. American
Telephone and Telegraph32 and American Stores.
33
One can attribute much of the recent decline in divestiture
cases reaching the Supreme Court to increased activity in the
Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal
Trade Commission.34 These agencies review mergers before
they occur and often work out consent decrees before cases
would otherwise go to trial.35 The pre-merger filings required
30. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501-04
(1974) (holding that although the parties had substantial market share, the
merger was not anticompetitive, as the parties lacked market power because
114 million of the 118 million tons of coal owned by United Electric were tied
up in existing contracts); United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp.
534, 538 (D. IlM. 1972); see also Andrew Chin, Note, Antitrust by Chance: A
Unified Theory of Horizontal Merger Doctrine, 106 YALE L.J. 1165, 1169-72
(1997) (discussing movement away from strict reliance on calculation of mar-
ket share in antitrust analysis).
31. See supra note 15 for a list of cases illustrating the timeline of Su-
preme Court divestiture decisions.
32. AT&T was decided in 1983. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983), affg United States v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C.
1982).
33. American Stores was decided in 1990. California v. Am. Stores Co.,
495 U.S. 271 (1990).
34. During the period between 1981 and 1992, 18,337 potential mergers
were reported under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of
1976; 4.1% of these required Second Requests, and 1.3% were challenged.
Similarly, during the period between 1993 and 1999, there were 21,702 merg-
ers notified under the Act, 3.2% of which required Second Requests and 1.8%
of which were challenged. Deborah A. Garza, Is the Past Prologue? A Com-
parative Analysis of the Clinton Antitrust Program and Suggestion of Changes
to Come, 15 ANTITRUST 64, 66-67 (2001).
35. See E. Thomas Sullivan, The Antitrust Division as a Regulatory
Agency: An Enforcement Policy in Transition, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 997, 1040-42
(1986) (examining the consent decree process). Indeed, the American Stores
merger was approved by the FTC, and the State of California instituted the
suit as a private litigant only after FTC approval. Assuming the courts made
the correct determination that the merger was anticompetitive, the FTC ap-
proval should not have been given. Therefore, American Stores was, arguably,
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by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act 36 allow these agencies to identify
potential antitrust violations and work with the companies in-
volved to avoid anticompetitive consequences ex ante.37 In
some instances, the companies themselves will abandon the
merger if serious regulatory problems appear on the horizon.38
The cases now obviated by agency review-those involving
horizontal and vertical mergers-previously appeared before
the Supreme Court as likely candidates for divestiture.39
C. THE EVOLVING DIVESTITURE JURISPRUDENCE
The increase in pre-merger participation by federal agen-
cies may affect the future of the Supreme Court's divestiture
jurisprudence. While the Supreme Court will likely continue to
consider divestiture as a viable remedy, the Court may reserve
the remedy for only the most exceptional and unique cases.
Microsoft, for example, may represent the last breed of divesti-
ture cases that the Supreme Court will consider. In the ab-
sence of a large merger to remedy under section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act, the Court will consider divestiture where a new
paradigm in business structure or complex and burdensome
behavioral relief renders injunctive relief inadequate.
D. FORMS OF DIVESTITURE
Divestiture may take various forms, ranging from total di-
an FTC "oversight," without which the Court's approval of the AT&T consent
decree would have been the sole Supreme Court consideration of divestiture in
the last two decades.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994).
37. In fiscal year 1997, for example, the Antitrust Division opposed thirty-
one merger transactions. A complaint was filed with a United States District
Court in only fourteen of these. Of those fourteen, thirteen resulted in consent
decrees. Only one case was actually litigated. In the remaining seventeen
transactions, eight were restructured and nine potential transactions were
abandoned. See Robert Pitofsky & Joel Klein, Federal Trade Commission Bu-
reau of Competition and Department of Justice Antitrust Division Annual Re-
port to Congress: Fiscal Year 1997 Pursuant to Subsection 6f) of Section 7A of
the Clayton Act Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976 5 (Aug.
8, 1998), available at http-//www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/97annrptlann972.htm.
38. In these cases, two other factors for a diminishing number of divesti-
ture cases, the increased time and resources necessary for a protracted litiga-
tion, certainly play a part. For example, United Airways and US Airways re-
cently called off their proposed merger after an announcement by the Justice
Department that it would institute a lawsuit to block it. Kenneth N. Gilpin,
Antitrust Challenge Stops United Merger With US Airways, N.Y. TIMEs, July
28, 2001, at C1.
39. See Appendix, infra, at 614-23.
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vestiture of newly purchased physical assets to partial divesti-
ture of stock holdings. 40 As in all remedy analyses, the funda-
mental question must be whether the "remedy shall be as effec-
tive and fair as possible in preventing continued or future
violations of the Antitrust Act in the light of the facts of the
particular case."41 As the cases and anticompetitive harms
have varied, so have the remedies.
In the past, when the antitrust violation damaged or
threatened to damage the competitive system itself, the Court
ordered the offending company to reestablish the newly ac-
quired entity as an independent competitor.42 The Court em-
ployed this remedy, for example, in Utah Public Service Com-
mission v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.43 The defendant El Paso,
the sole out-of-state supplier of natural gas for the State of
California, supplied over fifty percent of the natural gas used in
the state.44 Pacific Northwest, a nearby competitor, had at-
tempted to enter the California natural gas market.45 Within a
year after El Paso managed to kill a potential deal whereby Pa-
cific Northwest would supply natural gas to Pacific Gas & Elec-
tric, El Paso acquired over ninety-nine percent of the out-
standing stock of Pacific Northwest.46 The Court found that El
Paso, in absorbing Pacific Northwest, had attempted to "para-
lyze competition."47 On remand, the district court carried out
not the full divestiture mandated by the Court, but the "best
that might be made without complete divestiture."48 The
Court, reviewing the case after the district court's partial dives-
titure, reiterated the necessity of full divestiture to restore the
competitive balance.49
In other cases, where a company leveraged power in one
branch of its business for the benefit of another, the Court has
40. For an example of total divestiture, see Continental Oil Co. v. United
States, 393 U.S. 79, 79 (1968) (per curiam). For an example of partial divesti-
ture, see FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1926).
41. United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 335 (1947).
42. See, e.g., Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395
U.S. 464 (1969); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968).
43. 395 U.S. at 471-72.
44. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 652 n.2
(1964).
45. Id. at 654.
46. Id. at 654-55.
47. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 395 U.S. at 470.
48. Id. at 471.
49. See id. at 471-72.
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ordered the company to divest itself of its own business units.50
In United States v. Pullman Co., for example, Pullman both
manufactured and operated railroad sleeping cars.51 Pullman
leveraged its monopoly in the operations market to protect its
manufacturing position.52 By establishing itself as the only op-
erations firm contracted to service the railroads, Pullman suc-
cessfully erected barriers to entry in the manufacturing mar-
ket.53 The Court ordered Pullman to divest itself either of its
manufacturing business or its operations business, thereby si-
multaneously opening up the operations and manufacturing
markets.54 Upon lifting the barriers to entry, the Court left it
to the markets to determine whether a viable competitor would
emerge.55
In cases involving intellectual property, the Court has or-
dered mandatory licensing and the divestiture of stock but has
ruled against divestiture of physical assets.5 6 For instance, in
United States v. National Lead Co., the Court found a conspir-
acy between National Lead, its subsidiary Titan, and du Pont.57
In 1920, National Lead and Titan formed an international car-
tel, geographically dividing the markets for titanium pigments
and compounds. 58 In 1933, du Pont joined the conspiracy. 59
The Court ordered National Lead and Titan to divest them-
selves of all their stock holdings in their foreign subsidiaries.60
In addition, the Court ordered National Lead and du Pont to
grant nonexclusive licenses at reasonable royalties to third par-
ties.61 Although the Government argued that the Court should
force National Lead and du Pont to divest one of their two
manufacturing plants, the Court found this remedy supported
50. See, e.g., United States v. Pullman Co., 330 U.S. 806 (1947).
51. United States v. Pullman Co., 64 F. Supp. 108, 111 (E.D. Pa. 1945),
affd mem., 330 U.S. 806 (1947) (referring to a previous decision involving the
same parties at 53 F. Supp. 908).
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See United States v. Pullman Co., 53 F. Supp. 908, 908 (E.D. Pa.
1944).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
57. See id. at 324-28.
58. Id. at 325.
59. Id. at 326-27.
60. See id. at 363.
61. See id. at 335-51.
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by "neither precedent nor good reason."62 The primary viola-
tions were related to misuse of patents and exclusive agree-
ments; any incidental violation occasioned by the physical
plants did not warrant divestiture. 63
II. CASE STUDIES ON THE SUPREME COURTS RECORD
OF DIVESTITURE
To consider more closely the Supreme Court's treatment of
divestiture and its ultimate efficacy, this Article turns to five
instructive Supreme Court cases that resulted in divestiture.
It then examines five cases where the Court either rejected or
did not consider divestiture as a remedy. In general, the dives-
titures ordered by the Court have produced mixed success.6
An examination of past Supreme Court cases resulting in
divestiture can inform the modem assessment of whether di-
vestiture provides an appropriate remedy for a conduct viola-
tion in the new economy.65 Each of the five cases discussed be-
low provides a foundation on which to build an analysis.
Standard Oil stressed the importance of bad conduct in order-
ing divestiture, even in a case of multiple acquisitions.66 The
Court continued this emphasis on bad conduct in United States
v. Paramount Pictures.67 The Court cautioned against relying
only on injunctive relief when the defendant's past egregious
conduct made future compliance with a behavioral remedy
unlikely.68 This problem of enforcement surfaced again in the
AT&T litigation. Although the consent decree did not contain
allegations of AT&T's misconduct, its partial divestiture and
partial injunctive relief consumed substantial judicial resources
62. Id. at 351.
63. Id.
64. For a discussion of the effectiveness of some of the major pre-1962
cases, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
85-87 (1976).
65. The five cases examined where divestiture was ordered are Standard
Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v.
Pullman Co., 330 U.S. 806 (1947), affg mem., 64 F. Supp. 108 (1945); United
States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Maryland v. United States,
460 U.S. 1001 (1983), affg United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph
Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982); and California v. American Stores Co.,
495 U.S. 271 (1990).
66. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 76.
67. See 334 U.S. at 144.
68. See id. at 163-64.
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in its implementation. 69
These cases also provide guidance on the ultimate efficacy
of any requested divestiture relief. Although criticized by some
for not going far enough, many scholars argue that the Stan-
dard Oil divestiture achieved success by allowing the divested
entities to function independently. 0 In divestiture cases, such
as Pullman,71 however, the Court expended significant judicial
resources to achieve a result that in all likelihood would have
been dictated by market forces. 72 Under American Stores, even
if the Government decides not to pursue divestiture, a private
party can also seek divestiture if injured by the violation.7 3
A. CASES RESULTING IN DIVESTITURE
1. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States
The Supreme Court first ordered divestiture in the Stan-
dard Oil decision.74 Standard Oil had acquired stock in other
oil companies, creating a monopoly in petroleum distribution.75
Prior to the divestiture order, Standard Oil held shares of pro-
duction, refining, transportation, and marketing firms in the oil
industry.76 Production represented its weakest branch; in the
three remaining areas it controlled more than eighty percent of
national output.77
69. See generally Ben M. Enis & E. Thomas Sullivan, The AT&T Settle-
ment: Legal Summary, Economic Analysis, and Marketing Implications, 49. J.
MARKETING 127, 132-35 (1985).
70. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies for Domi-
nant Firm Misconduct, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1285 (1999).
71. 330 U.S. at 806.
72. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
73. California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 295-96 (1990).
74. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 79.
75. See id. at 71. It has been argued that as refining had relatively low
barriers to entry, it was Standard Oil's favored transportation agreements
with the railroads and the railroads' collusion among themselves that allowed
Standard Oil to retain its dominant position in the other business sectors. See
Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by "Raising Rivals'
Costs": The Standard Oil Case, 39 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2, 43-45 (1996). This ar-
gument finds support in that, prior to divestiture, Standard Oil paid eighty
cents per barrel to ship its product whereas its competitors were forced to pay
a dollar forty for the same shipment. See GEORGE WARD STOCKING, THE OIL
INDUSTRY AND THE COMPETITIVE SYSTEM 24 (1925).
76. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 32.
77. George Ellery Hale, Trust Dissolution: "Atomizing" Business Units of
Monopolistic Size, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 615, 618 (1940).
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Standard Oil's tremendous size, standing alone, could not
violate the Sherman Act.7 8  Instead, the Supreme Court con-
demned the company's actions in building its monopoly by
transferring stock of many diverse corporations to the central
company.79 These actions gave rise to a prima facie presump-
tion of "intent and purpose to maintain the dominancy over the
oil industry, not as a result of normal methods of industrial de-
velopment, but by new means of combination.., with the pur-
pose of excluding others from the trade."80 Although Standard
Oil's dominance had waned by the time of the Supreme Court's
opinion in 1911, the Court ordered the company to transfer the
stock of the subsidiary corporations back to the stockholders
who had owned the stock prior to the Standard Oil acquisi-
tion.81 In addition, the Court enjoined Standard Oil from vot-
ing or collecting dividends on any stock it retained.82
Although a groundbreaking decision for the Supreme
Court, the divestiture order merely transformed one nation-
wide monopoly into thirty-four regional monopolies, which di-
vided the United States into eleven marketing territories. 83
The decree's "fatal flaw," according to one scholar, was that it
left "economic control over the successor companies with the
same interests that had exercised control over the parent com-
pany., 84 Standard Oil willingly complied with the dissolution
78. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 75.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 78-82.
82. ROSTOW, supra note 25, at 6.
83. See RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR.
558 (1999); see also BRUCE BRINGRuEST, ANTITRUST AND THE OIL MONOPOLY
180 (1979) (indicating that after the dissolution decree, the successor firms
still respected the geographic monopolies and allowed no competition amongst
each other). But cf Hastings Wyman, Jr., The Standard Oil Breakup of 1911
and Its Relevance Today, in WITNESSES FOR OIL 63, 70-71 (1976) (arguing that
although there may have been a "gentlemen's agreement" amongst the di-
vested companies for some period of time, the tacit agreement did not last long
and competition quickly ensued).
84. Walter Adams, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Vic-
tories of Antitrust, 27 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (1951). Under the terms of the divestiture,
the owners of Standard Oil stock would become direct owners, instead of only
secondary owners through their ownership of Standard Oil, of the divested
companies. See STOCKING, supra note 75, at 54. Fourteen years after the di-
vestiture, John D. Rockefeller or the Rockefeller Foundation continued to be
the largest single shareholder in 26 of the companies from the "Standard Oil
Group," holding, in a majority of the 26, more than a 20% share of the total
stock. See id. at 57.
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decree because it failed to strip the most powerful owners of
their power. 85 One scholar, writing in 1940 about the Supreme
Court's divestiture record, opined that "[c]ommercial triumphs
among the successor units are almost universal."86 Further,
uncertainty surrounded the assertion that divesting the com-
panies into even smaller units would improve competition.87
Ironically, or perhaps tellingly, some of the same companies
created by the 1911 divestiture recently have merged with one
another, thus rebuilding part of the old Standard Oil empire.88
2. United States v. Pullman Co.
In contrast to Standard Oil, the divestiture remedy or-
dered in Pullman rewarded, rather than punished, the anti-
trust violator by allowing it to divest itself of a declining busi-
ness.89 Pullman, Inc., a holding company that controlled The
Pullman Company, Pullman-Standard Car Manufacturing
Company, and Pullman Car & Manufacturing Corporation of
Alabama,90 had contracted with railroads for exclusive rights to
operate and service sleeping cars.9 1 Pullman had maintained a
monopoly in the sleeping car service industry since 1900.92 It
had achieved its monopoly in part by buying out its competition
85. See BRINGHURST, supra note 83, at 180.
86. Hale, supra note 77, at 623.
87. See id. Indeed, it has been argued that the success of the Standard
Oil divestiture is due to the fact that it left many of the divested companies
still large enough to have their own corporate identity separate from Standard
Oil. See Kovacic, supra note 70, at 1301-02.
88. See, e.g., Bob Varvra, Rockefeller's Power, Wealth Changed American
Business, 92 Nat'l Petroleum News, at http'//www.petroretal.netlnpn/
2000/1200/1200cnt.asp (Dec. 1, 2000) (discussing the merger of Exxon and Mo-
bil, the proposed merger of Texaco and Chevron, and the merger of BP Amoco
and Arco, all of which were pieces of the original Standard Oil Company of
New Jersey). Interestingly, the reunification of these oil companies presents
concerns about their size outside of an antitrust context. For example, some
environmentalists are concerned that allowing these companies to merge will
allow them to better work together against environmental protections such as
ozone requirements. John Passacantando, the executive director of Ozone Ac-
tion, said that "[plutting Exxon and Mobil together creates the Death Star of
global warming." The Return of Big Oil, THE PROGRESSIVE, Jan. 1999, at 7.
89. United States v. Pullman Co., 330 U.S. 806 (1947), affg mem., 64 F.
Supp. 108 (1945).
90. Adams, supra note 84, at 25.
91. See United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123, 127 (E.D. Pa.
1943).
92. Id. at 125.
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in the operation and servicing of sleeping cars.93 Pullman also
maintained itself as the sole manufacturer of sleeping cars in
the United States by refusing to operate cars manufactured by
other companies. 94
Pullman used its monopoly position to exploit the railroads
in numerous ways. In addition to demanding a minimum profit
on every car, Pullman forced the railroads to bear all the risk of
loss.9 5 Because Pullman also dominated the equipment mar-
ket, it often operated outdated cars96 and denied consumers the
benefits of advances in technology by keeping other manufac-
turers out of the market.9 7 The company reaped high monopoly
profits from its position.
9 8
The lower court ordered Pullman to divest fully either the
manufacturing division or the operating division, leaving the
final decision to Pullman.99 A dissenting judge argued that
Pullman should be forced to sell its manufacturing division be-
cause it was the more profitable and easier to sell.1°° The judge
argued that Pullman would not be able to find an independent
buyer for the operating division, and would have to sell it to the
railroads.10' Indeed, railroads controlling more than ninety-
five percent of the passenger transportation in the United
States later bought the operating division. Thus, these rail-
roads acquired the monopoly formerly held by Pullman.
Divestiture did not have the intended effect. By the time
the Court entered the decree, the sleeping-car industry had
steeply declined. Pullman's president embraced the decree be-
cause, instead of punishing the company, it allowed Pullman to
sell off a dying part of its business and improve the company's
financial position. 102 Hence, the changing structure of the in-
dustry transformed the remedy into an economically rewarding
decree. The divestiture also failed to separate the financial
control of the manufacturing and operating divisions, allowing
93. See id. at 126.
94. Id. at 128; Adams, supra note 84, at 25.
95. Adams, supra note 84, at 25.
96. See Pullman, 50 F. Supp. at 132. When Pullman did fix the cars, they
charged the expense to the railroads. See id. at 25 n.11.
97. Id. at 133.
98. Adams, supra note 84, at 26.
99. See United States v. Pullman Co., 53 F. Supp. 908, 909 (E.D. Pa.
1944).
100. See id. at 909-10 (Biggs, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 910.
102. See POSNER, supra note 64, at 87.
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Pullman and the railroads to maintain their overlapping direc-
torships and common investors. 10 3 The divestiture left the in-
dustry subject to monopoly control (by the large railroads in-
stead of Pullman) and made Pullman a stronger, more
financially viable company.
3. United States v. Paramount Pictures
Whereas divestiture in Pullman seemed at first reasonable
but later proved unnecessary, divestiture in Paramount Pic-
tures seemed at first unreasonable but later proved necessary.
The defendants, Paramount Pictures and four other firms, pro-
duced motion pictures, distributed the films, and owned thea-
ters where they could be shown. 1°4 These defendants discrimi-
nated against small, independent theaters in favor of larger,
affiliated theaters.10 5 The larger theaters could transfer a film
to another theatre after the run expired, extend the run of any
film, and receive unlimited playing time.10 6
Before trial, the United States and the defendants entered
into a consent decree. 10 7 The decree provided that at the end of
a three-year probationary period, the United States could seek
the relief named in its amended complaint. 0 8 The United
States exercised this option after the three-year period expired,
and the case proceeded to trial. 10 9 At trial, the district court
denied the Government's request to divest the distributors of
all of their theatre holdings. 110 The trial court held that dives-
titure was unwarranted, provided too harsh a remedy, and
would not best serve the public interest.111 Instead, the district
court fashioned injunctive relief that provided for a mandatory
103. See Adams, supra note 84, at 30-31.
104. The four other firms were Loew's, Inc., Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp.,
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., and Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. Columbia
Pictures Corp., Universal Corp., and United Artists Corp., who distributed
films but did not own any theaters, were also named defendants in the suit.
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 140 (1948).
105. See id. at 159-60.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 141 n.3.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 141 n.3.
110. See United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 66 F. Supp. 323, 353
(S.D.N.Y. 1946), modified, 334. U.S. 131 (1948).
111. See id. The court did order the defendants to divest the theaters
which they owned jointly, but refused to order divestiture for theaters which
were owned solely. See id. at 356.
[Vol. 86:565
ANTITRUST DIVESTITURE
bidding mechanism for theaters to acquire the rights to show a
film. 112 Because the film producers had an interest in showing
their films in a proper venue, the district court allowed them to
use subjective factors in addition to price and to select the best
overall bid.'1"3
The Supreme Court, however, found the proposed bidding
process unwieldy. 114 Although noting that at first glance the
bidding system seemed commendable, the Court examined the
practical difficulties in instituting such a system. 115 First, in-
stituting the bidding system would force the judiciary into an
inappropriate role of continual business management with only
the crude mechanism of contempt to accomplish such a task.116
Second, delegating the management of such a subjective
mechanism to the corporations who precipitated the antitrust
violations in the first instance caused great concern. 117 There-
fore, the Court vacated the bidding system remedy and re-
manded to the district court to reconsider the appropriateness
of divestiture. 118 On remand, the district court ordered full di-
vestiture as the only means to ensure the end of the conspiracy
and the protection of consumer welfare."19
Although the divestiture initially spurred competitive ef-
fects, some have questioned recently whether the remedy has
overly hindered the defendants.12 ° Within ten years after the
resolution of the case, the number of independent producers
spiked from 70 to 170.121 More than fifty years after the case,
112. See id. at 346.
113. See id.
114. See Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 162-63.
115. The Court noted that as there were a variety of subjective criteria, the
standards to use for the bidding process were "incapable of precise definition."
Id. at 163.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 163-64.
[Dielegation of the management of the system to the discretion of
those who had the genius to conceive the present conspiracy and to
execute it with the subtlety which this record reveals, could be done
only with the greatest reluctance. At least such choices should not be
faced unless the need for the system is great and its benefits plain.
Id.
118. See id. at 165-66.
119. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881, 895-
900 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), affd sub nom. Loew's, Inc. v. United States, 339 U.S. 974
(1950).
120. See, e.g., Barry J. Brett & Michael D. Friedman, A Fresh Look at the
Paramount Decrees, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Fall 1991, at 2.
121. See Kraig G. Fox, Note, Paramount Revisited: The Resurgence of Verti-
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however, if the defendants wished to acquire a theatre, they
still needed judicial approval. 122 Although industry changes
had reduced substantially the defendants' market power, 123 the
enforcement of the divestiture remedy continued and arguably
restricted the defendants' trade unfairly.124
4. American Telephone and Telegraph
The 1983 AT&T case 125 is an example of an effective use of
the divestiture remedy, 126 but scholars continue to debate its
success. 127 The complex integration between the local and long-
distance telephone service markets complicated the divestiture
process, mandated extensive post-divestiture monitoring, and
may have ultimately limited the divestiture's competitive bene-
fits.' 2 In 1974, the United States Department of Justice filed
suit against AT&T, alleging violations of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. 129 At the time, AT&T was one of the largest
cal Integration in the Motion Picture Industry, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 505, 516
(1992).
122. See Barry J. Brett & Michael D. Friedman, A Fresh Look at the Para-
mount Decrees, 9 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 3 (1991).
123. At the time of the divestitures, the defendants produced approxi-
mately two-thirds of all the films released; currently, they produce approxi-
mately twenty-five to thirty percent. See id. at 4.
124. See id. at 23.
125. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), affg United States
v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982). See generally Enis &
Sullivan, supra note 69 (summarizing the legal issues of the AT&T case, offer-
ing a product-market framework for considering the implications of the set-
tlement, and providing a foundation for continued study of telecommunica-
tions marketing).
126. See, e.g., Kovacic, supra note 70, at 1302-03; Simran K. Kahai et al., Is
the "Dominant Firm" Dominant? An Empirical Analysis of AT&Ts Market
Power, 39 J.L. & ECON. 499, 512-13 (1996) (finding that after the divestiture
AT&T possessed little market power compared to other United States firms).
127. The measurement of the success of the divestiture decree is compli-
cated by the fact that AT&T operated in a heavily regulated industry. It is not
clear what would have happened absent this regulation, either before the di-
vestiture or after it. See Enis & Sullivan, supra note 125, at 135. Compare
Clement G. Krouse et al., The Bell System Divestiture/Deregulation and the
Efficiency of the Operating Companies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 61, 64 (1999) (arguing
that divestiture of AT&T created cost savings of 14.2% by 1993), with Geoffrey
M. Peters, Is The Third Time the Charm? A Comparison of the Government's
Major Antitrust Settlements with AT&T This Century, 15 SETON HALL L. REV.
252, 273 (1985) (predicting the only major change after the breakup will be the
increase in local rates).
128. See Enis & Sullivan, supra note 69, at 133-35.
129. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1973) (dealing with monopolies), amended by Pub. L.
No. 101-588, § 4(b), 104 Stat. 2880 (1990). At that time, a consent decree en-
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companies in the world and operated in local telephone service,
long-distance service, equipment manufacture, and research.1 30
AT&T, through its Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) supplied
local telephone service to more than eighty percent of U.S. sub-
scribers. 131 The Department of Justice broadly alleged that
AT&T had used its monopoly in local exchange service to
unlawfully leverage itself into dominant positions in the
equipment manufacturing and long-distance markets.1 32 It also
accused AT&T of predatory pricing 133 and refusing to allow
competitors access to equipment. 134
The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the consent de-
cree 135 entered into by the parties, which had been accepted by
the district court after minor adjustments.136 In the consent
decree, AT&T agreed to divest itself of local telephone service
providers in an attempt to establish fair competition in the
telecommunications market.137 The Court allowed AT&T to re-
tain its equipment manufacturing, research, and long-distance
divisions. 138 The consent decree also led to the formation and
tered into in 1956 was still in effect. See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 1956
Trade Cas. (CCH) 68, 246 (D.N.J. 1956).
130. See Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Winning by Losing: The
AT&T Settlement and Its Impact on Telecommunications, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 1,
3 (1983).
131. Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the Telecom-
munications Act: Regulation of Telecommunications Under Judge Greene, 50
HASTINGS. L.J. 1395, 1404 (1999).
132. See id.
133. The accusation of predatory pricing is particularly interesting because
AT&T was not free to set its own rates: It was heavily regulated and its rates
were constrained by regulatory authorities. See MacAvoy & Robinson, supra
note 130, at 27.
134. See id. at 14-15.
135. The parties had previously rejected two consent decrees, both propos-
ing complex regulatory solutions, that came to be known as Quagmire I and
Quagmire II. See Kearney, supra note 131, at 1410-11.
136. Judge Greene ordered four modifications before he would approve the
decree: Greene allowed the BOCs to market and install telephone equipment
(but not manufacture it)Greene forced AT&T to relinquish its profitable Yel-
low Pages business to the BOCs. Greene shifted about one-fourth of the reve-
nues from long-distance provision from AT&T to the BOCs. Greene banned
AT&T from participating in the "electronic publishing field" for seven years.
Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Losing by Judicial Policymaking: The
First Year of the AT&T Divestiture, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 225, 233-34 & n.51
(1985).
137. See Kearney, supra note 131, at 1412.
138. TIWOTHY J. BRENNAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTIcE, REGULATED FIRMs IN
UNREGULATED MfARKETS: UNDERSTANDING THE DIVESTITURE IN U.S. v. AT&T
5 (1986).
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extensive regulation of the seven BOCs and heavily regulated
each BOC. Because the Court feared that the BOCs would rep-
licate AT&T's tactics by using their local exchange monopolies
to leverage themselves unfairly into other markets, the decree
required court approval for expansion of services beyond the lo-
cal exchange. 139
Although scholars debate whether the AT&T divestiture
has resulted in lower costs for consumers, 140 competition in the
long-distance market has clearly increased. One need only con-
sider the number of evening phone callers trying to convince
the customer to change long-distance service providers to rec-
ognize the number of competitors in the market. Competition
also has emerged in the local service markets. In some metro-
politan areas, for example, consumers can choose between stan-
dard service from a BOC or digital telephone service. 141
Whether AT&T's divestiture has stunted or advanced techno-
logical development, however, remains unresolved.
Despite the acknowledged benefits of the AT&T divesti-
ture, the integrated nature of the local and long-distance tele-
phone markets may have limited the divestiture's overall suc-
cess. Although the Court initially attempted to completely
sever the operations of AT&T and the BOCs, 142 a relationship
continued between the entities because of the market integra-
tion. In fact, the Court actually forced AT&T to continue to
subsidize the BOCs long after the divestiture was supposedly
complete. 143 The Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
aided by the courts, also permitted AT&T to maintain its origi-
nal corporate structure, enabling AT&T to control a large part
of the long-distance market.144 The Department of Justice it-
self reversed its prior hard-lined stance by reducing the amount
of regulation imposed on the BOCs.145
The middle ground taken in the AT&T divestiture may
139. Id.
140. It is clear that during the first year after divestiture, consumers ex-
perienced higher costs and service of lower quality. See MacAvoy & Robinson,
supra note 136, at 235-43.
141. Ironically, in some areas this digital service is offered by none other
than AT&T, in conjunction with its partners.
142. Kearney, supra note 131, at 1412-13.
143. See Macavoy & Robinson, supra note 136, at 243.
144. See, e.g., United States v. W. Elec. Co., Inc., 797 F.2d 1082, 1085 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
145. See KEARNEY, supra note 121, at 1433-34.
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have contributed to the need for intense regulatory oversight. 146
Although the AT&T divestiture has led to the most dramatic
and lasting changes of any industry affected by a major divesti-
ture decree, 147 the intense regulatory oversight required to ac-
complish the divestiture may have reduced its benefits. Per-
haps the most important lessons to be drawn from the AT&T
experience are the difficulties with the procedure itself. The
case required tremendous oversight before and after issuing the
decree. Judge Greene, for example, spent many years working
on the AT&T case, first as the judge presiding over the litiga-
tion, then as the judge demanding modifications before he
would accept the consent decree, and finally as the overseer of
the divestiture itself.14 8 Judge Greene was particularly con-
cerned that enforcing the antitrust laws would harm consumers
in the form of higher telephone rates.149 Judge Greene issued
decisions on more than 160 requests for waivers under the
catch-all clause in the modified final judgment.150 He spent
much of his time on the AT&T divestiture until the passage of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 removed his jurisdiction
over the case. 151
146. One Antitrust Division economist drew a comparison between the
AT&T divestiture and the Vietnam War. A common view of U.S. participation
in the Vietnam War is that the country should have been fully committed to
fighting the war and staying there as long as was necessary to win, or it
should not have fought the war at all. The middle ground solution pursued by
policymakers led to severe consequences. Similarly, the theory behind divesti-
ture seems to suggest that there should be a complete severance or no sever-
ance at all. See BRENNAN, supra note 138, at 52-53.
147. On a related note, AT&T recently announced plans to restructure it-
self into four separately traded companies. See Deborah Solomon & Nikhil
Deogun, AT&T Board Approves Breakup Proposal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2000,
at A3. This is the largest restructuring of the company since the divestiture
decree; separation of AT&T into four distinct companies that perform different
functions has the practical effect of a divestiture order.
148. Kearney, supra note 131, at 1406-11, 1416, 1461-63.
149. FRED W. HENCK & BERNARD STRASSBURG, A SLIPPERY SLOPE: THE
LONG ROAD TO THE BREAKUP OF AT&T 241 (1988); see also discussion of
United States Steel, infra Part ll.B.2 (explaining the Court's conclusion that
divestiture was not a proper remedy because consumer oppression did not re-
sult from the illegal acquisition).
150. See Kearney, supra note 131, at 1440, 1465. The catch-all clause es-
sentially prohibited the BOCs from conducting business unrelated to the
"common carriage of local telecommunications." Id. at 1401.
151. Id. at 1459.
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5. California v. American Stores Co.
The Supreme Court decided American Stores, its most re-
cent divestiture case, in 1990.152 The decision permitted pri-
vate litigants to request divestiture as a remedy for Clayton Act
violations. 153 The State of California brought an action against
a supermarket chain that had acquired the stock of the largest
chain of supermarkets in California.1 54 The Court considered
California a private litigant in the action.155 The Supreme
Court overturned a Ninth Circuit case by holding that a private
litigant could request the divestiture remedy in appropriate an-
titrust actions.1 56 Because the Clayton Act authorized private
litigants to bring such suits, it also authorized them to seek all
remedies appropriate for such violations.1 57 A subsequent set-
tlement allowed American Stores to retain some of the newly
purchased supermarkets in return for selling off other stores in
California. 158
Although American Stores paved the way for private liti-
gants to request divestiture, few such cases have appeared in
federal district courts.1 59 Perhaps this indicates the ineffec-
tiveness of the divestiture remedy itself. Further, merely mak-
ing the divestiture remedy available does not remove the pri-
vate litigant's procedural hurdles to establishing standing 160 or
152. California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 271 (1990); see also Appen-
dix, infra, at 615.
153. Am. Stores, 495 U.S. at 275.
154. Id. at 275-76.
155. California was considered a private plaintiff just as if it had been an
individual private party. See Wayne H. Elowe, Note, Predictability in Merger
Enforcement after California v. American Stores: Current Uncertainties and a
Proposal for Change, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 612 (1992). Prior to
American Stores, it was unclear whether any party other than the United
States government could bring a suit requesting divestiture. With its holding
in American Stores, the Supreme Court allowed states to play a much greater
role in enforcement of federal antitrust laws. See id. at 602-03, 612.
156. See Am. Stores, 495 U.S. at 278-83.
157. See id.
158. Richard M. Steuer, Private Divestiture Actions: California v. American
Stores Co., 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 805-06 (1991).
159. There have, however, been some. See, e.g., Garabet v. Autonomous
Tech. Corp., 116 F. Supp. 2d 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Int'l Travel Arrangers v.
NWA, Inc., 1990 WL 116684 (D. Minn. July 31, 1990). Some have even been
successful. See, e.g., Comty. Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp.
1146, 1149 (W.D. Ark. 1995).
160. In cases brought by the United States government, simply proving the
violation might demonstrate public injury sufficient to support a divestiture
order. See Am. Stores, 495 U.S. at 295. Private litigants requesting the dives-
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the economic challenge of financing such protracted litigation.
B. CASES THAT DID NOT RESULT IN DIVESTITURE
Instances where the Court did not order or consider dives-
titure can also inform the divestiture analysis in the new econ-
omy. The Court has held that divestiture should only be used
where warranted. For example, although United States v.
United States Steel Corp. 161 involved a combination of compa-
nies similar to Standard Oil,16 2 the Court held that ordering
divestiture would not serve the public interest.1 63 United
States Steel exhibited none of the anticompetitive intent shown
by Standard Oil, and ordering divestiture would expose the
public to potential injury. 6 4 Similarly, in United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Co. of New Jersey,165 the Court avoided
divestiture because it could potentially expose United Shoe to
liability for the infringement of patents deemed necessary for
its business. 66
The Court also has refused to order divestiture where other
remedies would be more effective. In Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States,167 a majority of the Court did not believe
divestiture would provide the most appropriate remedy for the
antitrust violations.168 Because anticompetitive agreements
had caused the harm, injunctive relief could adequately remedy
the violation while avoiding the more draconian divestiture
remedy. 69 In United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,170 the
titure remedy, however, must still prove that they have standing to sue, just
as in other private antitrust actions. Id. at 296. Additionally, the defendant is
able to use traditional equitable defenses, such as laches or unclean hands,
which would be unavailable in a suit brought by the government. See id. at
296.
161. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
162. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
163. U.S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 457.
164. Id. at 455-57.
165. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co. of N. J., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
166. See id. at 45-46 (questioning the possible consequences of divestiture).
167. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), over-
ruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984)
(overruling the invocation of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, but stat-
ing that the doctrine was not necessary to the result reached, thus endorsing
the case's final adjudication).
168. Id. at 601.
169. Id. at 601, 603-05.
170. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
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Court held that divestiture would not benefit competition.171
Although the acquisition at issue increased General Dynamics's
market share, 172 pre-existing contracts bound much of the coal
supply acquired by the acquisition. 173 Thus, the acquisition did
not put the competitive system at risk, making divestiture un-
necessary and unwarranted. 7 4
1. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. of New Jersey
In one of the most examined divestiture cases, United
Shoe, the Supreme Court refused to order divestiture because
of overriding efficiencies. 175 On February 7, 1899, seven shoe
machinery companies merged into United Shoe Machinery
Company of New Jersey (United Shoe). 176 These seven busi-
ness firms held patents in several countries and manufactured,
sold, and leased shoe machinery. 177 The United States accused
United Shoe of acquiring competing companies and creating a
monopoly on machinery for bottoming shoes.178
The Government examined United Shoe's purchase of
Plant Company (Plant) for evidence of monopolistic behavior. 179
Plant held an improvement patent for a shoe-bottoming ma-
chine.180 The patent covered improvements on United Shoe's
machine design that, when coupled with United Shoe's own re-
cent improvements, would be of "very great[] practical impor-
tance" to United Shoe. 181 To avoid the risk of infringing Plant's
patents, United Shoe decided to buy Plant and thereby acquire
171. Id. at 511.
172. Id. at 494-96.
173. Id. at 499-500.
174. See id. at 503-04.
175. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co. of N. J., 247 U.S. 32, 66-
67 (1918) ([Ilt is impossible to believe.., that the great business of [United
Shoe] has been built up by... the exercise of power .... The installations
could have had no other incentive than the excellence of the machines and the
advantage of their use ... ."). United Shoe has been examined extensively for
its nexus of the tensions created by the public protections of antitrust law and
the private protections of intellectual property law. See, e.g., William H. Page,
Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust Policy, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1, 60-
62 (1991).
176. United Shoe, 247 U.S. at 38.
177. Id. at 39.
178. Id. at 38.
179. Id. at 47-49.
180. Id. at 47.
181. Id. at 51.
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the improvements on its own machinery.182 Without this pur-
chase, United Shoe may have been forced to halt further devel-
opment on its shoe machinery design.18 3
Despite the Court's own admission that the acquisition re-
moved some degree of competition, the Court refused to review
all fifty-six of United Shoe's transactions. 8 4 Whether United
Shoe purchased businesses because of machinery improve-
ments, or to acquire patents or machinery it did not own,
United Shoe gained efficiency through its acquisitions. 8 5 Al-
though the Court acknowledged the magnitude of United Shoe,
efficiency dictated its size.186 Customers benefited from the
improvements made by United Shoe and the cost savings it re-
alized.18 7 United Shoe's strategy kept it informed of the "me-
chanical march; to fall back would have been its destruction."88
2. United States v. United States Steel Corp.
In United States Steel, the Court concluded that the defen-
dant's illegal acquisition did not warrant divestiture because
price-fixing and customer oppression did not follow the acquisi-
tion.189 The United States had charged United States Steel
with violating the Sherman Act by purchasing the stock of sev-
eral iron and steel companies with the purpose and effect of
unduly restricting competition.190 Additionally, the Govern-
ment argued that United States Steel's role as a holding com-
pany unduly restricted competition by amalgamating the vari-
ous corporations into one "super-combination of overwhelming
182. United Shoe, 247 U.S. at 51. For a good discussion on the tying as-
pects of United Shoe, see Victor H. Kramer, The Supreme Court and Tying Ar-
rangements: Antitrust as History, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1013, 1026-30 (1985).
183. United Shoe, 247 U.S. at 51.
184. Id. at 54. Notably, this is similar to the current Department of Justice
and FTC merger guidelines, which consider the efficiency gains of the pro-
posed merger. "[M]erger-generated efficiencies may enhance competition by
permitting two ineffective (e.g., high cost) competitors to become one effective
(e.g., lower cost) competitor." Antitrust Policies and Guidelines, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 at 20, 573-11
(Apr. 8, 1997).
185. United Shoe, 247 U.S. at 54.
186. Id. at 56.
187. Id.
188. United Shoe, 247 U.S. at 55.
189. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 445-51
(1920).
190. Id. at 436-37.
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power."191 The size of the company had become "substantially
dominant" in the industry through the "combination of power-
ful and able competitors." 92 The Department of Justice argued
that, while prices of some products fluctuated, the holding
company increased prices in almost every instance. 193
The Court compared the United States Steel situation to
Standard Oil'94 and American Tobacco,195 two cases where the
Supreme Court had ordered divestiture. 196 The Court distin-
guished United States Steel from these cases based on the com-
panies' intent in acquiring subsidiaries. 197 The Court found
that in buying subsidiary companies, Standard Oil intended to
drive competitors out of the marketplace and prevent them
from exercising their right to trade. 198 In contrast to these
"brutal" methods, 199 the Court reiterated the lower court's de-
scription of United States Steel's behavior as "absolutely guilt-
less."200 Although United States Steel grew to an impressive
size, the company had not tried to fix or maintain prices, and it
did not require customers to agree to limit purchases.201 Its
competitors did not accuse it of aggression, nor did it attempt to
oppress and destroy other companies.202
Like Standard Oil, American Tobacco also exhibited simi-
lar brutal tactics. 203 The combination in American Tobacco al-
lowed the company to present its competitors with a choice be-
tween "submission or ruin."2°4 The company's modus operandi
consisted of forming new companies and taking stock in them
to veil the actual result; placing power in seemingly independ-
ent corporations to bar the entry of new competitors; and
spending millions of dollars to acquire plants and close their
191. Id. at 419.
192. Id. at 442-43.
193. Id. at 420.
194. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); see dis-
cussion supra Parts L.A., HL.A.1.
195. United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
196. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 77-82; Am. Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 187-88.
197. U. S. Steel, 251 U.S. at 455-57.
198. Id. at 455.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 440-42.
202. Id. at 441, 449, 451.
203. Id. at 456.
204. Id.
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operations.20 5
In both Standard Oil and American Tobacco, the corpora-
tion systematically consolidated its market domination, but
concealed its actions by controlling the stock of seemingly inde-
pendent competitors. 20 6 In these cases, dissolution became a
"manifest instrumentality and inevitable."20 7 The Court distin-
guished United States Steel from these two cases because acts
conducted in violation of the Sherman Act were different from a
condition that "'is not only a continued attempt to monopolize,
but also monopolization. '"' 208 Because of this distinction, the
Court in United States Steel determined that enforcement of
the statute did not require the broad remedy of divestiture em-
ployed in Standard Oil and American Tobacco.20 9
Although the Sherman Act clearly instructs courts to "pre-
vent and restrain violations of the Act, a court has discretion
to choose remedies warranted by the particular situation.210
The Court held that the circumstances in United States Steel
did not warrant divestiture because of the ten-year delay in
litigation, corporate development worth millions of dollars, and
the public investment, including foreign trade, that had oc-
curred.211 Given the circumstances, the Court determined that
dissolution failed to serve the public interest and that divesti-
ture would risk injury to the public interest, including the dis-
ruption of foreign trade.212
3. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States
In Timken, the Supreme Court determined divestiture un-
necessary to restore competition to the affected market.213 The
United States charged Timken Roller Bearing Company (Tim-
ken) with violating sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act by re-
205. Id.
206. Id. at 455-57.
207. Id. at 457.
208. Id. at 451 (quoting Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1, 77 (1911)).
209. Id. at 451-52, 457.
210. Id. at 452; see 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1995).
211. Id. at 453.
212. Id. at 450. The Court rejected the notion that price imitation by com-
petitors was, by nature, a "submission" to illegally exerted power when copy-
ing price increases would result in otherwise unobtainable profits. Id. at 449-
50.
213. Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 604 (1951).
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straining interstate and foreign commerce. 214 The district court
found that Timken had business agreements with British Tim-
ken and Societe Anonyme Frangaise Timken (French Timken)
to allocate trade territories among themselves; fix prices on
products sold in another's territory; protect their markets and
eliminate outside competition; and participate in cartels to re-
strict imports and exports with the United States. 215 While the
district court enjoined the illegal conduct and ordered divesti-
ture,216 a majority of the Supreme Court declined to uphold the
divestiture. 217
Justice Reed's concurring opinion reasoned that the statu-
tory provisions did not specifically empower courts to apply di-
vestiture to violations of the Sherman Act.218 Courts should or-
der divestiture to restore competition, not to punish violators,
and should use divestiture only when the circumstances render
less severe remedies unavailable.219 Justice Reed also stated
that courts should exercise judicial restraint before granting
the remedy of divestiture. 220 The circumstances in Timken
made divestiture inappropriate because injunctive relief had
already remedied the defendant's restraints of trade.221 Tim-
ken had violated the Sherman Act by entering into anticom-
petitive business agreements with British Timken and French
Timken.222 Injunctive relief had already successfully dissolved
the offending contracts, making divestiture inappropriate. 223
4. United States v. General Dynamics Corp.
The Court refused to employ divestiture as a remedy in
General Dynamics because, although the acquisition increased
214. Id. at 594-95 (1951), overruled by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
215. Id. at 595-96. Timken and Mr. Dewar, an English businessman, pur-
chased all of the stock of British Timken. See id. at 595. Although British
Timken stock was later publicly sold, 30% and 24% of British Tinken was still
controlled by Timken and Dewar, respectively. See id. Timken and Dewar
formed French Timken and continuously owned all of its stock. See id.
216. Id. at 600.
217. Id. at 600-01.
218. Id. at 602 (Reed, J., concurring).
219. Timkin Roller Bearing, 341 U.S. at 603 (Reed, J., concurring).
220. Id. (suggesting United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319
(1941), as an appropriate guideline).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 603-04 (Reed, J., concurring).
223. Id.
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market share, it did not affect market power.224 Between 1954
and 1959, Material Service Corporation acquired thirty-four
percent of the stock of its competitor United Electric Coal Com-
panies (United Electric).225 United Electric operated strip and
open-pit mines.226 General Dynamics subsequently purchased
Material Service and became the fifth-largest commercial coal
producer in the United States.227 By 1966, General Dynamics
owned all of United Electric's outstanding stock.228 The United
States filed suit against General Dynamics, alleging Material
Service's acquisition of United Electric violated section 7 of the
Clayton Act by lessening competition in the production of
coal.229
The trial court addressed the probability of competition
lessening within the market because of the acquisition of
United Electric.230 Although the Government viewed the coal
industry as a single-product market, the district court instead
defined the relevant market as the "energy market," which in-
cluded coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear energy, and geothermal
power.231 The district court also rejected the Government's
proposed geographic markets because the underlying statistics
did not relate to coal consumption patterns. 232 The Supreme
Court agreed with the district court's holding that "'divestiture
[would not] benefit competition even were this court to accept
the Government's unrealistic product and geographic market
definitions."2 33
The Court considered not only the concentration of market
share but also the resulting effect on market power. At trial
the court found that General Dynamics acquired 118,000,000
tons of coal with the acquisition of United Electric. 234 Although
this acquisition increased General Dynamics's market share, it
224. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498, 511 (1974).
225. Id. at 489; see supra note 30.
226. Id. at 489.
227. Id. at 489.
228. Id. at 490.
229. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1995).
230. Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 491.
231. Id. In addition to coal, "relevant" market fuels included "oil, natural
gas, nuclear energy, and geothermal power." Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 494 (quoting United States v. Gen. Dynamic Corp., 341 F. Supp.
534, 560 (N.D. Ill. 1972), affd, 415 U.S. 486 (1974)).
234. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534, 538 (N.D.Ill.
1972).
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did not necessarily increase its market power. Only 52,000,000
tons of the newly acquired coal were economically feasible to
mine, and all but 4,000,000 tons had "been sold under long
term contracts."235 Further, utilities consumed the majority of
the coal and were "sophisticated knowledgeable purchasers
wielding great economic power.,23W This left General Dynamics
little freedom to exploit any power that it gained from the
merger.237 Because the acquisition did not harm competition, it
did not warrant divestiture.238
5. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.
Because the plaintiffs in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-
O-Mat, Inc. had not suffered an "antitrust injury," the Court
denied a remedy.239 Brunswick Corporation had become one of
the two largest manufacturers of bowling equipment in the
United States by the 1970s. 240 The bowling industry experi-
enced a boom in the 1950s and Brunswick's sales increased
dramatically.241 Brunswick sold lanes, automatic pinsetters,
and other equipment that required large expenditures. 242
Brunswick financed these sales by extending credit to purchas-
ers and taking a security interest in the goods.243 In the early
1960s, the bowling industry declined and Brunswick experi-
enced difficulty in collecting its receivables. 2 " To overcome its
financial difficulties, Brunswick acquired and operated default-
ing bowling alleys.245 These acquisitions made Brunswick the
largest operator of bowling alleys nationwide, even though it
controlled only two percent of all bowling alleys.246
The suit arose because operators of bowling alleys in cer-
tain geographic markets 247 argued that Brunswick's acquisi-
235. Id.
236. Id. at 559.
237. See id.
238. Id. at 560.
239. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977).
240. Id. at 479.
241. Id.
242. Id. Brunswick sold a lane and pinsetter for $12,600 in the 1950s. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id..
245. Id. at 479-80. Brunswick bought 222 bowling alleys and closed or
later divested 54 of them. Id. at 480.
246. Id.
247. The respondents were from markets in which Brunswick had acquired
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tions lessened competition and created a monopoly in violation
of section 7 of the Clayton Act.248 At trial, these plaintiffs tried
to establish damages by arguing that if Brunswick had closed
the acquired bowling alleys, the plaintiffs would have realized
higher profits.249 The jury agreed with the plaintiffs and the
court ordered Brunswick to divest the bowling alleys in these
geographic areas.250 The case came before the United States
Supreme Court to decide whether the plaintiffs could obtain
antitrust damages when a competitor's continued business op-
eration prevented the plaintiffs from realizing an increase in
their market share.251
The plaintiffs claimed that they suffered an antitrust in-
jury because Brunswick's decision to operate bowling alleys in
their cities placed them in a worse financial position than if
Brunswick had allowed the alleys to close.252 The Court dis-
agreed and held that plaintiffs must prove an "injury of the
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows
from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. 2 53 Plain-
tiffs' injury did not meet this definition because they sought
damages for profits they would have realized had competition
been reduced by Brunswick not entering the market.254 Given
the absence of antitrust injury, the Court did not need to ad-
dress divestiture.
C. SYNTHESIS
A general framework for the divestiture analysis emerges
from these ten cases. Although divestiture cases involving
structural violations provide an easier analysis, as long as a
party possesses market power, a court may order divestiture if
it answers two questions in the affirmative. First, does divesti-
ture provide the least restrictive alternative to remedy the al-
bowling alleys: Pueblo, Colorado; Poughkeepsie, New York; and Paramus, New
Jersey. Id.
248. Id. at 480-81; see 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1995).
249. Id. at 481. Although the issue was not presented to the Court,
Brunswick involved the question of a private litigant seeking divestiture un-
der the federal antitrust laws which later was to be resolved in California v.
American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990). See supra note 152 and accompa-
nying text.
250. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 482.
251. See id. at 483.
252. Id. at 486.
253. Id. at 489.
254. Id. at 488.
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leged harm? Second, will divestiture effectively remedy the vio-
lation?
The first consideration asks whether divestiture provides
the least restrictive alternative. In a case involving a large
merger, the Court has indicated that divestiture should be the
first remedy considered.255 As seen in Standard Oil and Para-
mount Pictures, a court should order divestiture if the corpora-
tion has demonstrated a pattern of anticompetitive conduct
that make its compliance with injunctive relief a dubious
proposition. If, however, the corporation did not exploit any po-
tential market power, as seen in United States Steel, the Court
will feel free to impose less severe remedies. Although non-
structural violations do not necessarily foreclose divestiture,
the Court has indicated in cases such as United Shoe and Tim-
ken that these conditions favor injunctive relief.
If divestiture appears necessary, the second question asks
whether divestiture can effectively remedy the violation. In
answering this question, United States Steel, Pullman, and
General Dynamics provide guidance. If the violation does not
produce a net negative effect on competition, as in General Dy-
namics, divestiture is unwarranted. If divestiture accom-
plishes simply what the market would have remedied in its
natural course of operations, as in Pullman, then judicial inter-
vention becomes unnecessary. Similarly, if divestiture of the
corporation's assets will create a public risk, as in United States
Steel, a court should not order divestiture. Where the divesti-
ture will restore competition to the market, however, as in
AT&T and Standard Oil, it should be considered.
This Article will next apply this analytical framework to
determine whether divesture remains an appropriate remedy
in the new economy. By using the facts presented in Microsoft
to clarify the analysis, general conclusions should emerge that
can be applied to any modern divestiture analysis. Before pro-
ceeding, the Article will first explain the distinct attributes of
the software and e-commerce businesses and the unique issues
they present for divesture analysis in the new economy.
255. California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 281 (1990) ("Divestiture
has been called the most important of antitrust remedies. It is simple, rela-
tively easy to administer, and sure. It should always be in the forefront of a
court's mind when a violation of § 7 has been found.").
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III. THE SOFTWARE AND E-COMMERCE BUSINESS
ENVIRONMENT
A. CREATION OF OPERATING SYSTEMS
IBM brought computer technology into homes by its broad
commercial distribution of the personal computer (PC).256 PCs
function because of operating systems that serve as platforms
on which applications run.27 The operating systems schedule
the execution of tasks and control the flow of information. 258
Operating systems also provide an interface through which the
user can operate the computer.259 Microsoft launched its first
operating system, MS-DOS, in 1981. 260 MS-DOS required us-
ers to enter precise commands to make the computer func-
tion.261 Microsoft later developed Windows, which allowed us-
ers to disregard precise verbal commands and operate the
computer by clicking on icons. 262 In 1990, Microsoft released
Windows 3.1, and five years later it released Windows 95.263
Unlike earlier versions, Windows 95 combined the Windows
and MS-DOS functions to create a single operating system.2M
B. RAPID TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
The computer industry theoretically can change overnight.
Microprocessor capabilities are expected to double every eight-
256. David Moschella, Ten Turning Points in the IT Industry's History,
COMPUTERWORLD, December 13, 1999, at 33.
257. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 13, United States v. Microsoft Corp,
253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-5212, 00-5213).
258. Findings of Fact No. 2 at 2, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.2d
59 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232), available at http'I/www.usdoj.gov/
atr/cases/f3800/msjudge.pdf.
259. Id.
260. Findings of Fact No. 6, at 3, Microsoft (No. 98-1232).
261. Id.
262. Findings of Fact No. 7, at 3-4, Microsoft (No. 98-1232).
263. Findings of Fact No. 8, at 4, Microsoft (No. 98-1232).
264. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, at 15, Microsoft (Nos. 00-5212, 00-
5213). Although Windows operating systems dominate the market, competing
operating systems exist. For example, IBM sells OS/2 and PC-DOS, Apple
sells Mac OS, and the GNU and Linux operating systems are available. Id.
Sun sells Java which is best described as a set of technologies that exposes the
underlying Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) in an operating system
to developers. Findings of Fact No. 28, at 13, Microsoft (No. 98-1232). As Java
runs on any operating system which utilizes a Java Virtual Machine, develop-
ers could write applications in Java, posing a threat to Microsoft's Windows.
See Findings of Fact Nos. 73-74, at 37-38, Microsoft (No. 98-1232)
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een months. 265 As capabilities of microprocessors increase,
prices decrease. 266 This continual improvement in microproces-
sor capabilities makes the "computer industry inherently un-
predictable."2 67
C. COMPETITION IN THE SOFTWARE MARKET
The software market is characterized by particularly fierce
competition2 68 that stems from the nature of software itself.269
Software never wears out, and only new innovations render
software obsolete.270 Software makers therefore continuously
compete against their own products as well as against other
software makers.271 If their software does not continually im-
prove, consumers will not purchase new versions.272
Software's potential is also linked to the microprocessors
on which it runs. As microprocessor capability increases and
prices decrease, affordable software can be created to take ad-
vantage of the increased capability and achieve previously un-
attainable goals.2 73 These swift technological advances quickly
make products less valuable and even obsolete.2 74
Once developed, software can be copied at virtually no
cost.2 7 5 The primary expenditure goes to the research and de-
velopment necessary to write the software in the first in-
265. Initially issued as a prediction in 1965 by Gordon Moore, co-founder of
Intel, "Moore's Law" has become part prophecy, part standard for the micro-
processor industry. Intel, Moore's Law, at http'/www.intel.com/researcl
siliconlmooreslaw.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2001).
266. For example, a Zenith Z-station 425Sh sold for $3,083 in June 1992
but sold for $1,419 in May 1993, a price decrease of fifty-four percent in one
year. William J. Cook et al., Computer Chaos, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPT.,
July 26, 1993, at 47.
267. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, at 16, Microsoft (Nos. 00-5212, 00-
5213). In fact, even Bill Gates was late in discerning the importance of the
Internet. Microsoft contends that if it had misjudged the importance of the
Internet, "it would be an anachronism today." Id. at 17.
268. Id. at 18.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, the Justice Depart-
ment, and Antitrust Theory, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 621, 639 (1996) ("After the pro-
gram is developed, ouput costs are essentially zero.").
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stance.276  Once the software is written, however, marketing
becomes the primary cost.277 Although this may tend to create
a natural monopoly,278 it also allows a rival to enter and quickly
displace the dominant firm. Moreover, use of Internet
downloads to disseminate the rival's software can provide con-
sumers with instantaneous and free access.279
D. THE NEW ECONOMY AND NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
Despite the fluidity, dynamics, and competition of the
software market, an entrant to the market of operating sys-
tems, or any other software market, may still face significant
barriers to entry280 because of network externalities. 281 An op-
erating system holds no value for a consumer, unless it is com-
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See id. at 639-41.
279. See, e.g., Teague I. Donahey, Terminal Railroad Revisited: Using the
Essential Facilities Doctrine to Ensure Accessibility to Internet Software Stan-
dards, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 277, 293-94 (1997) (explaining that the software market
has "significant predatory pricing activity" where companies attempt to force
other companies out by distributing free software).
280. Barriers to entry represent the hurdles a potential competitor must
overcome in order to enter the market. For a classical study of the subject, see
JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956). It has been argued that
barriers to entry represent just normal market efficiencies that "properly dis-
suade entry" and so should be commended, "rather than condemned." See
David L. White, Shaping Antitrust Enforcement: Greater Emphasis on Barri-
ers to Entry, 1989 BYU L. REv. 823, 826-28 (1989). However, the Court has
used barriers to entry as the basis for finding antitrust violations. See, e.g.,
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967) (finding that the ac-
quisition in question may raise the barriers to entry because a new contract
would necessitate competing with a large company through advertising).
281. See, e.g., OPENING NETWORKS TO COMPETITION: THE REGULATION AND
PRICING OF ACCESS (David Gabel & David Weiman, eds.) (1998); David A.
Balto, Standard Setting in the 21 Century Network Economy, COMPUTER &
INTERNET L., June 2001, at 6 (characterizing network effects as standard set-
ting and examining the ease of using other markets to defend a network mo-
nopoly); David McGowan, Network and Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual
Property, 24 J. CORP. L. 485 (1999) (analyzing the conditions under which
network barriers to entry can be overcome); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Anti-
trust Remedy or Monopoly Leveraging by Electronic Networks, 93 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1 (1998) (arguing that network effects represented critical facilities simi-
lar to the barrier posed by the railroads in Standard Oil); Steven C. Salop &
R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards,
and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 617 (1999) (discussing the problems of
network barriers to entry and the method on its insulation of monopoly
power); James B. Speta, Tying, Essential Facilities, and Network Externalities:
A Comment on Piraino, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1277 (1999).
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patible with applications. 282 The more applications that be-
come available, the greater value the operating system has to
the consumer.283 To make an application available to an oper-
ating system, however, it must be rewritten, or "ported," onto
that platform, which involves significant time and resources. 284
Although this structure does not necessitate a one-product mar-
ket, a one-product market is not unlikely.285
If a single product does becomes dominant, a potential en-
trant has to overcome the significant barrier of the "chicken-
and-egg problem" to enter the market.286 The potential entrant
must have a large application base to attract consumers. Be-
cause of the high cost of porting software, however, the entrant
cannot develop the needed application base without an estab-
lished, or securely predicted, consumer base.28 7 Although theo-
retically a software designer could design an operating system
and port itself all of the desired software, the associated cost
could prove to be prohibitive.
Network externalities are not limited to operating systems.
Many software markets, from databases to word processing
programs, also experience network effects. 288 In the case of
word processing programs, consumers desire to have a common
platform to allow others to access their document.289 Although
this creates a less burdensome hurdle than in operating sys-
tems, it still tends toward single-product domination.290 There-
fore, the network model applies to other parts of the new econ-
omy beyond Microsoft and the operating systems market.
IV. LESSONS FOR MICROSOFTS REMEDY
The unique aspects of the software and e-commerce busi-
ness environment present several complications in the divesti-
ture analysis. Because the Microsoft litigation has brought
many of these unique aspects to the forefront, the case provides
an excellent platform on which to discuss the implications for
282. Microsoft Findings of Fact No. 30, at 12, Microsoft (No. 98-1232).
283. Id. at 12
284. Id.
285. David McGowan, Networks and Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual
Property, 24 J. CORP. L. 485,499 (1999).
286. Findings of Fact No. 30, at 12, Microsoft (No. 98-1232).
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., Donahey, supra note 279, at 294-95.
289. See id.
290. Id.
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divestiture in the new economy.
Despite the Bush administration's recapitulation on dives-
titure, the following analysis may also provide guidance in the
Microsoft litigation itself. The case against Microsoft in favor
of divestiture could go forward for at least two reasons. First,
several state attorneys general have stated that they will con-
tinue to pursue litigation against Microsoft even if the federal
government settles its case.291 Second, as discussed above,
American Stores empowers private litigants to seek divestiture
as a remedy for injuries caused by antitrust violations. Any
number of litigants could continue to seek the divestiture of
Microsoft. 292
A. ANALYZING SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF DIVESTITURE IS
DIFFICULT
Even in traditional markets, analyzing the ultimate effi-
cacy of divestiture poses no small amount of problems. The
scarcity of compliance information makes it difficult to draw on
the historical record of the Supreme Court's divestiture juris-
prudence. The two major studies gathering compliance infor-
mation-one by Richard Posner,293 and the other by Pfunder,
Plaine, and Whittemore 294-were conducted in the 1970s and
examined only select cases.295 This lack of comprehensive in-
formation partially stems from the absence of post-divestiture
monitoring. Government employees, once the litigation phase
has ended, tend not to monitor the companies ordered to divest
as vigorously as they should. This is partially attributable to
291. As noted above, California and eight other states have expressed a
willingness to continue to consider divestiture as a remedy even without the
support of the Department of Justice. See supra note 6 and accompanying
text.
292. See California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 278-85 (1990). And in-
deed, there are at this time a number of private antitrust actions against Mi-
crosoft where, although divestiture has not yet been sought, it may be later.
See In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 2001 WL 137255 at *2 (D. Md.
Feb. 15, 2001).
293. POSNER, supra note 64, at 77-85. Some of the cases examined by Pos-
ner, such as Pullman, are discussed above. See supra text accompanying
notes 82-91.
294. Malcolm R. Pfinder et al., Compliance with Divestiture Orders Under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act: An Analysis of the Relief Obtained, 17 ANTITRUST
BuLL. 19, 139-78 (1972).
295. The Pfunder article examines both compliance with judicial orders in
cases that have been fully litigated and compliance with consent decrees de-
manded by the FTC. Id.
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under-budgeted, overworked government staffs. The shifting
structure of industries subject to divestiture also contributes to
the lack of compliance information. After market conditions
have changed, it becomes difficult to determine whether the di-
vestiture or the changing market caused the change in the di-
vested entity.
B. DIVESTITURE LESSONS FROM MICROSOFT
The records from the trial and appellate courts in Microsoft
remain relevant to analyze whether divestiture is appropriate
for any new-economy market. Although Microsoft itself may no
longer raise the divestiture issue, the records created by the
trial court and the court of appeals provide a useful tool in ex-
amining the circumstances under which divestiture remains an
appropriate remedy in the new-economy markets. The answer
may depend on the characterization of the software industry
and on the individual firm, in this case, Microsoft. 296
1. Software as a Dynamic Market: "Take My Operating
System... Please!"2 97
Under the characterization of software as a dynamic indus-
try, divestiture could prove to be an empty gesture. If the
changing market would force the firm to change its behavior or
divest itself of the relevant assets, pursuing divestiture through
litigation would waste both time and money. In Pullman,298 for
example, the company's president welcomed the consent de-
cree. 299 Because of the changing nature of demand in the in-
dustry, the operations division no longer generated significant
profit.30 0 The consent decree allowed, and even mandated, that
Pullman divest itself of this failing operation, an action which
Pullman would have taken even without judicial intervention.
Similarly, in Microsoft, Microsoft envisions eliminating its
own need for the Windows operating system. Under a new plan
called NET, still in its early planning stages, Microsoft would
296. Of course, the Court of Appeals did not overturn or vacate Judge Jack-
son's initial findings of fact. The judge on remand will have to accept these
findings under the doctrine of the law of the case. See United States v. Micro-
soft, 253 F.3d 34, 116 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
297. Apologies to Rodney Dangerfield.
298. United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943). For
further discussion, see supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
299. See POSNER, supra note 64, at 87.
300. See id.
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create a platform to which customers would subscribe in order
to access applications over the Internet. With such a platform,
Microsoft could sell its applications effectively regardless of
whether it still controls Windows. 30 1
Even without such a platform, the divestiture of Windows
could still remain an empty gesture. A final judgment from the
United States Supreme Court could take at least two years. In
this time frame, the structure of the industry could change so
much that Windows no longer dominates the market. Alterna-
tively, Windows may become only one among several viable al-
ternatives widely available and compatible with then-existing
technology.
If Microsoft no longer requires Windows or Windows no
longer dominates the market, divestiture could bring about two
ill effects. First, a divestiture order at that point would possi-
bly allow Microsoft to sell off a dying and unprofitable part of
its company. Second, it would result in the expenditure of sub-
stantial judicial resources to remedy a violation that the mar-
ket arguably has already remedied. Neither consequence sup-
ports divestiture.
Under the industry's dynamic market characterization, di-
vestiture does not provide an appropriate remedy. Instead, the
proper remedy has presented itself in National Lead. 302 Na-
tional Lead involved the development of titanium pigments for
paint manufacture-a new, explosive, and valuable market.30 3
The defendants National Lead and Du Pont had entered into
an agreement whereby they would cross license any present
and future patents. 3°4 The district court characterized the mul-
tiplicity of patents as "instruments of domination of an entire
industry."30 5 At the time of the suit, National Lead and du
Pont together accounted for approximately ninety percent of
301. See Microsoft's Cunning Plan, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 6,2001, at 53-54.
302. United States v. Natl Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 336-37 (1947). For fur-
ther discussion, see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
303. See Nat'l Lead, 332 U.S. at 338. Sales of titanium rose from 100 tons
in 1920 to 133,000 tons in 1944. Sergei S. Zlinkoff & Robert C. Barnard, The
Supreme Court and a Competitive Economy: 1946 Term, 47 COLUMi. L. REV.
914, 934 (1947).
304. Under the agreements, National Lead was to be the exclusive supplier
in North and South America; its subsidiary Titan Inc. was to be the exclusive
supplier everywhere else in the world. See Nat'l Lead, 332 U.S. at 341-43. In
1933, du Pontjoined the conspiracy. Id. at 326.
305. United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 532 (S.D.N.Y.
1945).
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the domestic production of pigments.30 6 The Government urged
the Court to divest one of the manufacturing plants from both
National Lead and du Pont.307 The Court noted, however, that
the findings of fact showed the existence of "vigorous and effec-
tive competition" between National Lead and du Pont. Thus,
the Court affirmed mandatory cross licensing of their patents
to third parties at a reasonable royalty rather than granting
the Government's request.30 8 This resolution respected the par-
ties' property rights and allowed the market to develop in a
competitive environment.
The issuance of a mandatory licensing or cross-licensing
scheme would have similar benefits for a software violation.
This would allow a firm to keep pace with the changing busi-
ness environment and reap the rewards from its valuable intel-
lectual property, while preventing the firm from wielding un-
due power derived from the intellectual property.
2. Software Must Keep Pace with Competitors: "Only the
Paranoid Survive"309
Divestiture could also present problems in the new econ-
omy by halting software developments and ultimately harming
consumers. As in United Shoe310 and United States Steel,311
firms must keep in step with the "mechanical march."312 To or-
der a divestiture could, at best, remove the efficiencies and
cost-savings consumers gain from an integrated company. At
worst, it could severely cripple the divested firm and produce
two companies in constant fear of infringing each other's pat-
ents.31
3
306. See id. at 347.
307. See id. at 351.
308. Id. at 350-53. However, National Lead and Titan Inc. were forced to
divest themselves of all stock holdings in their foreign subsidiaries. See id. at
351-52. On the subject of mandatory or cross licensing, now that Windows is a
stable, standardized target for developers, it is important, arguably, to main-
tain the stability and coherence of the technology so that developers can rely
on a uniform set of technological specifications when writing their applica-
tions. Mandatory licensing might fragment the standard and lead to confusion
and new strategic behavior both on the operating system and developer level.
309. ANDREW S. GROVE, ONLY THE PARANOID SURVE: HOW TO EXPLOIT
THE CRISIS POINTS THAT CHALLENGE EVERY COMPANY AND CAREER (1999).
310. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co. of N.J., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
311. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
312. United Shoe, 247 U.S. at 55.
313. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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In addition, divestiture poses a significant public risk. By
most accounts, the technology sector drove the economic pros-
perity of the 1990s. It provided the foundation for the new
economy. As the economy stagnates, a judge who orders dives-
titure must be mindful of the large repercussions that could
resonate by shaking one of the keystones of the software indus-
try. As the Court suggested in United States Steel, although a
remedy should cure the desired ill, the ultimate goal is the
safeguarding of the consumer interest through the promotion of
competition. 314
3. Software Dominated by a Few: Use Your Illusion315
If the district court accepts a more stagnant view of the in-
dustry, different implications arise for the remedy. Although
the face of software can change overnight, certain "blue-chip"
firms will likely remain in the market. One can argue that
even though software products dynamically change in the mar-
kets, certain software corporations remain relatively stable.
Even if these firms' products may eventually be replaced (very
possibly by the firms themselves), the firms will continue to
maintain market power with dominant platforms in their rele-
vant markets. This viewpoint derives support from the advan-
tages provided to software by the operation of network effects.
Even under this market characterization, however, divesti-
ture remains a questionable remedy. Analytically, the phe-
nomenon of network monopolies has been compared to natural
monopolies.316 The AT&T breakup has applied the corollary. 317
As others have pointed out, however, a crucial distinction exists
between the two: a network monopoly derives its power from
the demand side, whereas a natural monopoly derives its power
from the supply side.318 Because of the necessity for uniform
standards, any new economy divestiture will not create compe-
tition amongst new equals. Instead, the divestiture will simply
create a new leader possessing the same market power as its
314. See supra notes 211, 212 and accompanying text.
315. GUNS N' ROSES, USE YOUR ILLUSION I (Geffin Records 1991).
316. See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Remedy for Monopoly
Leveraging by Electronic Networks, 93 N.W. U. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1998).
317. See Joshua M. Greenbaum, BabySofts, Anyone?, SOFTWARE MAG., Au-
gust 1998, at 10. Greenbaum, writing in 1998, proposed the division of Micro-
soft into six separate companies, calling these companies "BabySofts" in refer-
ence to the Babybells resulting from the AT&T breakup. See id.
318. See, e.g., Donahey, supra note 279, at 285-88; McGowan, supra note
281, at 488-89.
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pre-divestiture predecessor. Therefore, unless a court imposes
strict conduct restraints on each of the newly formed compa-
nies, divestiture would not advance the public interest under
the United States Steel analysis.
4. The Microsoft Case as a Consent Decree Failure: "Fool me
Once, Shame on You. Fool me Twice, Shame on Me."319
Perhaps the strongest argument for divestiture in Micro-
soft derives not from an industry characterization but from a
characterization of Microsoft's specific case and conduct. Be-
cause of the previously unsuccessful attempt at injunctive re-
lief, the courts could have no choice but to order divestiture, re-
gardless of the market in which Microsoft operates. 320
In 1994, the United States sued Microsoft for violating sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.321 The parties settled the
dispute in 1995 by entering into a consent decree that prohib-
ited various Microsoft practices. 322 In 1997, the Department of
Justice initiated a contempt proceeding, arguing that Micro-
soft's bundling of Windows and Internet Explorer violated the
earlier decree.323 In 1998, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia held that Windows and Internet Explorer repre-
sented a genuine integration and did not violate the earlier de-
cree.324 In that same year, the Department of Justice also filed
the current action. 325 The history of the Microsoft litigation
does not bode well for successful injunctive relief.326
319. Anonymous.
320. Interestingly, in 1995, Judge Stanley Sporkin deemed that the con-
sent decree entered into by the Department of Justice and Microsoft was un-
workable and "that the U.S. government is either incapable or unwilling to
deal effectively with a potential threat to this nation's economic well-being."
Although Judge Sporkin's subsequent removal from the case would likely chill
Judge Kollar-Kotelly's willingness to follow his example by issuing a remedy
which the Department of Justice did not request, it is possible. See Labaton,
supra note 6, at 3.
321. See Petition by the United States for an Order to Show Cause Why
Respondent Microsoft Corporation Should Not Be Found in Civil Contempt at
2, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 980 F. Supp. 537 (D.D.C. 1997) (No. 94-
1564), rev'd, 147 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
322. See id.
323. See id. at 2-4.
324. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 952 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
325. See Complaint of United States at 53, United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (No. 98-1232), vacated, 253 F.3d 34
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
326. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. As one commentator on
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Similar to objections raised to the proposed remedy in
Paramount Pictures, injunctive relief in the Microsoft case
would force the judiciary into an inappropriate and ongoing
business management role327 and give too much discretion to
an untrustworthy antitrust violator.328 The issues raised in
prior Microsoft litigations, all centering around Microsoft's use
and restrictions on the use of its operating system, support
both propositions. Throughout the proceedings, Microsoft has
questioned the judiciary's capabilities of understanding the
highly technical issues.329 The announcement of a new Micro-
soft operating system followed shortly by the announcement of
a possible government antitrust suit does not best serve the
public interest.330 Further, despite its technical successes, Mi-
crosoft continues to have, at best, a strained relationship with
the Justice Department.
Therefore, where the firm proves reticent and unwilling to
change its behavior, divestiture should be the reluctant rem-
edy. If the judiciary cannot continuously guard Microsoft's be-
havior and Microsoft cannot properly police itself, behavioral
remedies will likely fail, leaving structural remedies as the last
resort. Even under this analysis, however, courts should ap-
proach divestiture with caution. Although these factors sim-
plify the analysis, they do not necessarily guard consumer wel-
fare.
The courts should also bear in mind that any divestiture
will still involve injunctive relief. The court must couple dives-
consumer issues observed, "Microsoft has flaunted conduct remedies for
years." Labaton, supra note 6, at 3 (quoting Mark N. Cooper, research director
of the Consumer Federation of America).
327. See Kearney, supra note 131, at 1401-02. Judge Greene oversaw the
administration of the consent decree (the Modification of Final Judgment, or
MFJ) from the divestiture of AT&T in 1984 to the passage of the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996, at which time Greene terminated the MFJ. Id. at 1402.
During this twelve-year period, Kearney argues, Greene upheld the purpose of
the MFJ and administered the judgment efficiently. See id. Other scholars
have been less approving of Greene's actions. See, e.g., PETER HUBER, LAW
AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET COMMON LAW
RULE THE TELECOSM (1997) (cited in Kearney, supra, at 1398 n. 8).
328. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
329. See, e.g., Brief for Defendant-Appellant Microsoft Corp. at 73, United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 00-5212).
330. In addition to challenging Windows 95 and Windows 98, as discussed
above, the Justice Department also has announced it may consider an anti-
trust challenge to Microsoft's new operating system, Windows XP. See John R.
Wilke, Microsoft Drafts Settlement Bid in Antitrust Suit, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10,
2001, at A3.
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titure with injunctive relief to avoid the reconsolidation of
power. As evidenced by Paramount Pictures331 and AT&T,332
these injunctive protections can cause problems later. Because
of its use of partial divestiture, the AT&T enforcement con-
sumed substantial judicial resources and required numerous
modifications. 333 Even in Paramount Pictures, where the court
ordered a complete divestiture, the constraints on conduct lin-
gered half a century after deciding the case, inhibiting competi-
tion rather than promoting it. 334
C. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
Alternative remedies also should inform any divestiture
consideration. Partial divestiture provides one such alterna-
tive.335 The court always can order a spin off of smaller chunks
of the company, rather than dividing it into two larger pieces.
This could encourage innovation and stimulate competition, by
forcing the smaller companies (or the companies that bought
certain pieces) to keep pace with the rapidly changing, highly
competitive market. Certainly, the breakup of AT&T stimu-
lated the development of Silicon Valley.
Permanent injunction provides a second alternative. Con-
duct relief can rapidly change the behavior of the company.336
A conduct-oriented injunction could forbid a firm from certain
anticompetitive practices, such as purchasing or acquiring ex-
clusive rights, ideas, or products from competitors. It could
prohibit the firm from acquiring intellectual property rights
from outsider firms and insure that it does not discriminate
against its customers.337 For example, a court could require
mandatory licensing of intellectual property or the publication
of prices to inform customers of the terms given to their com-
petitors. In a tying case, an injunction could also prohibit bun-
dling of goods or require court approval to do so, thus hindering
the firm from using its market power in one market to increase
331. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
334. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
336. See R. Craig Romaine & Steven C. Salop, Slap Their Wrists? Tie Their
Hands? Slice Them Into Pieces? Alternative Remedies for Monopolization in
the Microsoft Case, 13 ANTITRUST 15, 18 (Summer 1999).
337. See id.
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sales in another.338
In addition, an injunction could set maximum prices that a
firm would be allowed to charge. This option, however, seems
particularly troubling in the new economy because of the very
rapid change of the market and the regulatory oversight that
might be required to monitor conduct.339
Imposing a fine creates a fourth option. 340 When dealing with a
firm such as Microsoft, however, a fine of any sum, other than
the sum of total revenue, would probably not deter Microsoft
from its obviously profitable behavior. Antitrust law is replete
with repeat offenders, such as Eastman Kodak and du Pont.341
CONCLUSION
Whatever the future holds for the Microsoft litigation, the
lessons from the past are clear. Because fashioning a remedy is
a fact-specific inquiry, the lines of precedent "cannot be much
more than guides."342 By keeping the precedent firmly in mind,
however, certain patterns emerge. These patterns find applica-
tion in any divestiture analysis and, using the knowledge
gained from Microsoft, apply to any new economy divestiture
case.
First, the duty to enforce the antitrust laws requires that
the remedy eliminate the prohibited evil; it must open to com-
petition the formerly closed market. Otherwise, the litigation
338. See id. Apparently, the Department of Justice may now abandon its
challenge to Microsof's tying arrangement. See Michael Brick, Competitors
See Ruling Leaves a Giant That is Now Largely Unfettered, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
7, 2001, at C4; Steve Lohr, Pendulum Swings to Microsoft, But the Degree Re-
mains Unclear, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2001, at Cl; John R. Wilke & Ted Bridis,
Regulators Won't Seek Microsoft Breakup, WALL S. J., Sept. 7, 2001, at A.
339. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
340. 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1987).
341. Eastman Kodak has been forced to defend numerous antitrust suits
over the years. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Service, Inc.,
504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d
263 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 853 F. Supp. 1454,
1488 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); GAP Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 519 F. Supp. 1203,
1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Revere Camera Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 81 F. Supp.
325 (N.D. Ill. 1948). As has Du Pont. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 334 (1961); United States v. Nat'l Lead Co.,
332 U.S. 319, 324 (1947); Precision Piping & Instruments, Inc. v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 951 F.2d 613, 615 (4th Cir. 1991); Alberta Gas Chem. Ltd.
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235, 1236 (3d Cir. 1987); Eskofot
A/S v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 872 F. Supp. 81, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 1981 WL 2175 (D.D.C. 1981).
342. Nat'l Lead, 332 U.S. at 335.
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has been an empty exercise. The method to open the market
will vary from case to case. Some instances will warrant in-
junctive relief, while others will warrant full or partial divesti-
ture. Just as market closure depends on the structure of the
market itself, so will the opening of the market.
Second, the remedy, on the whole, must inure to the public
benefit. The antitrust laws aim to prevent monopolies and pro-
tect the consumer welfare. From its earliest jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has weighed the benefits of the remedy against
its potential harms. This practice has evolved with the refor-
mulation of merger guidelines 343 to include the consideration of
efficiencies.
Third, courts should avoid expending their judicial re-
sources to produce an outcome that will later prove unneces-
sary. If the market structure will correct the harm in its natu-
ral course or dynamic market changes will render the
divestiture remedy moot, courts should not select divestiture.
Instead, the judiciary should look to conduct-based remedies
such as injunctions or mandatory licensing. If dominant firms
emerge in the dynamic new economy because of the total
economies of scale involved, equitable, rigorous conduct-driven
remedies, when carefully monitored, should suffice to remedy
any market failure.
Finally, the courts should be wary when brandishing the
club of divestiture. Although divestiture can be the most effec-
tive remedy, it also is the most draconian. While courts can
modify consent decrees or lift injunctions, they cannot retroac-
tively change the consequences of divestitures without grave
difficulty. This is particularly important when courts deal with
markets and technologies with which they have little experi-
ence. If only long experience can warrant rulings on per se vio-
lations under Sherman Act section 1, then certainly divestiture
deserves at least as strict a standard.
Divestiture jurisprudence will only become more difficult to
predict. If the United States regulatory agencies continue to
defuse potential divestiture cases before they reach a remedy
stage, few divestiture cases will reach the Supreme Court. The
cases that will arise, however, will not involve the traditional
Clayton Act section 7 violations where the Government seeks to
break up concentrations of power. Instead, courts will primar-
ily consider conduct-oriented infractions, with the remedy being
343. See supra note 184.
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much more difficult to fashion. In these infractions, when con-
duct-based injunctive relief proves inadequate, divestiture be-
comes appropriate.
Although the antitrust laws are flexible and robust enough
to handle questions involving e-commerce and the new econ-
omy, divestiture generally will not provide the best remedy.
The history of Supreme Court divestiture cases shows that di-
vestiture is inappropriate for markets characterized by dy-
namic forces or dominated by intellectual property protections.
It also should not be used in instances where the divestiture of
a company would put consumers at risk from increased alloca-
tive inefficiency. Instead, courts should consider alternative,
conduct-based remedies that will both remedy the antitrust
harm and will promote the competitive process. Courts must
exercise care to ensure that the cost of correcting the market
failure does not exceed the anticompetitive injury visited on
consumers.
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APPENDIX
These fifty-two cases based on federal antitrust law have
been litigated through the courts to the Supreme Court with
the exception of AT&T, which was broken up after a consent
decree rather than full litigation. " The following table com-
piles these cases and indicates for each the year of the Supreme
Court opinion, the basis for the Court's review, and the nature
of the alleged antitrust violation. The final remedy in each case
is summarized in the column entitled "Disposition." The ac-
tions taken by the Court for each case are summarized in the
column "Supreme Court Disposition." Finally, in the column
entitled "Supreme Court Disposition Category," the Court's ac-
tions are categorized by the directness of the Court's ruling to
the case's issue of divestiture.
Legend:
D = Divestiture
No D = No Divestiture
CD = Consent Decree
Comp. Merger = Complimentary Merger
HM = Horizontal Merger
VM = Vertical Merger
Conduct = Conduct Violation
Category 1 = Cases where the Supreme Court ruled di-
rectly on divestiture as an appropriate anti
trust remedy in the case.
Category 2 = Divestiture cases where the Supreme Court
ruled on the substantive law of the case with
out a direct holding on the appropriateness of
divestiture in the case.
Category 3 = Divestiture cases where the Supreme Court
disposed of the case on grounds other than
divestiture or substantive law.
344 Maryland v. United States, See 460 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1983).
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